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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
                                        
 
SAROKIN, Circuit Judge. 
 
     This case poses the question of whether a provision in a 
collective bargaining agreement which establishes eligibility for 
employee participation in a health and welfare plan can be 
reformed as the result of mutual mistake by the contracting 
parties.  Because this case involves a multiemployer plan, we 
conclude that reformation is not available and that third party 
beneficiaries to the underlying agreement are entitled to rely on 
its plain language notwithstanding that such language was the 
result of the mistake or negligence of the contracting parties.  
     Here, the Central Pennsylvania Teamsters Health & Welfare 
Fund ("Welfare Fund") seeks to recover delinquent funds from 
McCormick Dray Lines, Inc. ("McCormick").  McCormick argues that 
these funds are not delinquent because they are sought pursuant 
to a clause in a collective bargaining agreement that McCormick 
avers was the result of a "mutual mistake" or a "scrivener's 
error."  The district court agreed and ruled in favor of 
McCormick.  We reverse. 
 
                                I. 
     McCormick is a trucking company employing approximately 
sixty drivers, of whom twenty-two are union drivers.  The union 
drivers are represented by Teamsters Local Union No. 764 ("Local 
764" or "the union").  From the 1970s until 1991, McCormick was a 
party to a series of collective bargaining agreements with Local 
764.  During that period, Charles Greenawalt was the President 
and Business Representative for Local 764, and he was the 
principal negotiator for Local 764 in the collective bargaining 
negotiations.  James Webb has been President of McCormick since 
1984, and in that role negotiated with the union on behalf of 
McCormick.   
     Included in these bargaining agreements were provisions 
requiring that McCormick make monthly contributions to the 
Welfare Fund on behalf of the union drivers for purposes of 
providing them with medical benefits for themselves and their 
families.  Typically, just before the time that a prior 
collective bargaining agreement would expire, the Welfare Fund 
would send to Local 764 "suggested" health and welfare language 
for the collective bargaining agreement.  Greenawalt would then 
ask his secretary to incorporate the "suggested" language into a 
draft of the new collective bargaining agreement.  If the parties 
to a collective bargaining agreement wanted changes made to this 
"suggested" language, they would negotiate those changes 
themselves and then submit them to the Welfare Fund for approval. 
     In 1983, McCormick and Local 764 negotiated a change in the 
employee Eligibility Clause to the Health and Welfare portion of 
their contract.  Specifically, the Eligibility Clause in the 1983 
Agreement was negotiated to include the following language: 
     Section 2.  Eligibility of Employees 
 
     (A)  An employee shall be deemed to be an eligible 
     member employee if such employee has worked at least 60 
     hours for the employer during the preceding month . . . 
     . 
 
     The Sixty 
 
     (B)  Any newly hired employee shall qualify as an 
     eligible member employee after forty-five (45) working 
     days or on the sixtieth calendar day whichever comes 
     first. 
Joint Appendix ("JA") at 484.  Before this negotiated clause 
could be included in the collective bargaining agreement, 
Greenawalt had to obtain approval from the Welfare Fund.  The 
fund did agree, reluctantly, to approve the language.  This same 
language then also appeared in the 1985 collective bargaining 
agreement.   
     Greenawalt testified that just before the Union's 1985 
collective bargaining agreement was about to expire, he received 
suggested language from the Welfare Fund, as per usual, and this 
language was then incorporated into the draft contract.  
Afterwards, Greenawalt and Webb negotiated over the dollar amount 
McCormick would be required to contribute to the Welfare Fund.  
Webb never made any requests to change any of the other Welfare 
Fund language, including the Eligibility Clause.  
     Once Greenawalt and Webb agreed to the essential terms of 
the contract, Greenawalt sent Webb a copy of the 1988 Agreement 
accompanied by a letter asking that Webb "[p]lease review [the 
Agreement] and get back to [him] with any additions or 
corrections which [Webb] fe[lt] need[ed] to be made" prior to 
signing the agreement.  Webb testified that he never specifically 
checked the Eligibility Clause of the contract because it had not 
been the subject of specific negotiations.  No changes were made 
to the Fund's proposed language, and the 1988 Agreement was 
formally executed.   
     About one year following the execution of the 1988 
Agreement, Webb noticed that the language in the Eligibility 
Clause of Article XII did not include the same language that had 
appeared in the past two collective bargaining agreements.  
Specifically, the Eligibility Clause in Article XII provided in 
relevant part: 
 
     Section 2.  Eligibility of Employees 
 
     A.  Any newly hired employee shall qualify as an 
     eligible member employee as of the first day of the 
     month immediately following his employment if such 
     employee meets the requirements of Subsection (B) next 
     below. 
 
     B.  An employee shall be deemed to be an eligible 
     member employee if such employee has worked at least 60 
     hours for the Employer during the preceding month. 
JA at 202-03.  Unlike the Eligibility Clause that appeared in the 
1983 and 1985 Agreements, this clause included no additional 
requirement that the employee work at least 45 days prior to 
eligibility.     
     Webb testified that he called John Kleinfelter, the 
administrator of the Welfare Fund, to find out how the mistake 
had occurred, and that "John kind of pooh-poohed and ha-ha'd and 
laughed about it."  JA at 302.  Webb also contacted Greenawalt, 
informing him that, unless Local 764 agreed to reform the 
Eligibility Clause to be identical to that in the 1983 and 1985 
Agreements, he would pursue a formal grievance under the parties' 
collective bargaining agreement.  Greenawalt testified that he 
"was as surprised as [Webb] was" to learn of the actual language 
in the Eligibility Clause.  JA at 416.  However, he further 
testified that the point at which the error was discovered was so 
long after the Agreement was signed that he was reluctant to 
change it unilaterally because he feared the union could be held 
liable by the Welfare Fund.  Therefore, on August 18, 1989 
Greenawalt formally advised Webb that Local 764 would not agree 
to modify the Eligibility Clause and that McCormick should file a 
grievance with the American Arbitration Association if it wished 
to pursue the issue.   
     Webb did not pursue a formal grievance.  Instead, McCormick 
adopted a new practice of notifying each newly hired employee 
that there had been an error in the 1988 Agreement, explaining to 
each of them that they would become eligible for health and 
welfare benefits only after they had completed their 45th work 
day or their 60th calendar day and requiring them to sign a form 
acknowledging that they were aware of this.   
     In 1991, auditors conducted a routine examination of 
McCormick's payroll records on behalf of the Welfare Fund and the 
Pension Fund.  This payroll audit revealed that McCormick had not 
been making contributions on behalf of newly hired employees in 
accordance with the Eligibility Clause as it actually appeared in 
the 1988 Agreement.  In particular, the auditors discovered that 
McCormick owed $27,930.00 in delinquent contributions to the 
Welfare Fund.  There is no dispute that under the plain language 
of the 1988 Agreement, McCormick owes the $27,930.00.   
     Webb testified that after learning of the audit, he again 
called John Kleinfelter at the Welfare Fund.  He testified that 
during his conversation, Kleinfelter told him "[W]e haven't come 
after you for the money, have we? . . . [W]ell you know it was a 
mistake."  JA at 309.  Greenawalt testified, however, that he 
spoke to Kleinfelter about the language, too, and that 
Kleinfelter never told him it was a mistake but that it was the 
standard language they sent at the end of every contract and that 
if McCormick had not wanted to agree to it, they should have gone 
back to the Welfare Fund for approval to change it.   
     After failing in its efforts to recover the delinquent 
funds, the Welfare Fund commenced this action against McCormick 
on April 22, 1993.  Meanwhile, in 1991, Donald Deivert replaced 
Greenawalt as President of Local 764.  On June 17, 1993 -- almost 
two months after the Welfare Fund filed the instant action in 
federal court -- Webb executed a Memorandum of Agreement with 
Deivert, acknowledging that there was an error in the 1988 
Agreement.  Deivert's testimony, however, indicates that he 
signed this Agreement out of fear that he and the Union would be 
sued and the union drivers would lose their jobs if he did not.   
     In March of 1994, both parties filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment.  The district court granted summary judgment in 
favor of McCormick, finding that the Eligibility Clause in the 
1988 Agreement was subject to reformation because the language in 
the clause was the result of a mutual mistake or a scrivener's 
error.   Central Pennsylvania Teamster Pension Fund, et al. v. 
McCormick Dray Lines, Inc., No. 93-2118, slip op. at 16 (E.D. Pa. 
Nov. 21, 1994) (hereinafter "Memorandum Opinion").  This appeal 
followed. 
 
                               II. 
     The district court had jurisdiction over this action brought 
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 
U.S.C.  1001 et seq. pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  1331.  This court 
exercises appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  1291. 
     Our review of the district court's order for summary 
judgment is plenary.  Stroehmann Bakeries v. Local 776, 969 F.2d 
1436, 1440 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1022 (1992).  We 
thus apply the same test applied by the district court: (1) are 
there no material facts in dispute; and (2) is one party entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law?  Id. at 1441 (citing Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 56(c); International Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. 
Racho Trucking Co., 897 F.2d 1248, 1252 (3d Cir. 1990)). 
                               III. 
     In this dispute, as in others in which welfare funds seek to 
recover payments that are delinquent under the terms of 
collective bargaining agreements with unions, the Welfare Fund 
occupies the position of third-party beneficiary -- i.e. the 
beneficiary of the agreement between the union and McCormick.  
See, e.g., Agathos v. Starlite Motel, 977 F.2d 1500, 1505 (3d 
Cir. 1992).  Third-party beneficiaries are generally subject to 
the same defenses that the promisor (here McCormick) could raise 
in a suit by the promisee (here the union).  See id. (citing J. 
Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts  17-10 (3d ed. 
1987)).  Such defenses include fraud in the inducement, breach of 
contract and mutual mistake.   
     In 1960, however, the Supreme Court held that the rule is 
different for employee benefit plans that are third-party 
beneficiaries pursuant to collective bargaining agreements.  In 
Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459, 470-71 (1960), the 
Court held that an employer could not raise the union's breach of 
a collective bargaining agreement as a defense against an 
employee benefit plan suing for delinquent contributions unless 
such a defense was preserved in "unequivocal words" in the 
collective bargaining agreement.   
     In arriving at its conclusion, the Court explained that a 
"collective bargaining agreement . . . is not a typical third- 
party beneficiary contract."  Id. at 468.  Rather, the Court 
noted the economic reality that many persons and entities have a 
direct interest in the viability of a multiemployer plan:  "If 
Benedict and other coal operators having damage claims against 
the union for its breaches may curtail royalty payments, the 
burden will fall in the first instance upon the employees and 
their families across the country."  Id. at 469.  Furthermore, 
other employers would be required to increase their royalty 
payments to maintain the planned schedule of benefits.  Id.   
     The principle the Supreme Court set forth in Benedict Coal - 
- i.e., that a breach by a union does not relieve the employer of 
its obligations to make pension contributions to a multiemployer 
welfare fund -- was ratified by Congress through the enactment of 
section 515 of ERISA, which reads as follows: 
     Every employer who is obligated to make contributions 
     to a multiemployer plan under the terms of the plan or 
     under the terms of a collectively bargained agreement 
     shall, to the extent not inconsistent with law, make 
     such contributions in accordance with the terms and 
     conditions of such plan or such agreement. 
29 U.S.C.  1145; see 126 Cong. Rec. 23,039 (1980) (remarks by 
Rep. Thompson) (endorsing the reasoning of Benedict Coal in 
passing section 515).     
     Congress's purpose in enacting section 515 was to allow 
multiemployer welfare funds to rely upon the terms of collective 
bargaining agreements and plans as written, thus "permit[ting] 
trustees of plans to recover delinquent contributions 
efficaciously, and without regard to issues which might arise 
under labor-management relations law . . . ." 126 Cong. Rec. 
23,039 (1980) (remarks by Rep. Thompson).  Congress noted that 
employer delinquency "detract[ed] from the ability of plans to 
formulate or meet funding standards and adversely affect[ed] the 
financial health of plans."  Id.  With the passage of section 
515, Congress sought to ensure that benefit plans are able to 
rely on contribution promises of employers "because plans must 
pay out to beneficiaries whether or not employers live up to 
their obligations."  Benson v. Brower's Moving & Storage, Inc., 
907 F.2d 310, 314 (2d Cir. 1990) (citing Central States, 
Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Gerber Truck Serv., 
Inc., 870 F.2d 1148, 1151 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc)).    
     The Seventh Circuit has explained that under section 515, 
"[t]he pension or welfare fund is like a holder in due course in 
commercial law . . . [and thus] entitled to enforce the writing 
without regard to understandings or defenses applicable to the 
original parties."  Gerber Truck, 870 F.2d at 1149.  
Multiemployer welfare funds are not participants in collective 
bargaining agreement negotiations and typically have no knowledge 
of the nature of the original dealings between the union and the 
employer.  Instead, they rely upon the accuracy of the terms of 
the collective bargaining agreements of all of their members in 
making the actuarial calculations that produce their contribution 
and payout systems for all of their members.  See Robbins v. 
Lynch, 836 F.2d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1988).  
     Indeed, even if a multiemployer welfare fund has some 
knowledge of the negotiating history leading up to the signing of 
a collective bargaining agreement, it is evident from section 515 
and Congress's intent in passing it that the fund should still be 
able to rely on the language of the collective bargaining 
agreement as written and agreed to by both the union and the 
employer.  Congress sought to minimize the administrative costs 
of detecting and collecting delinquencies that "detract from the 
ability of plans to formulate or meet funding standards and 
adversely affect the financial health of plans" through the 
passage of section 515.  126 Cong. Rec. 23,039 (1980) (remarks of 
Rep. Thompson).  If multiemployer welfare funds were required to 
interpret the language in collective bargaining agreements based 
upon information they may have regarding the negotiations 
underlying the collective bargaining agreements, the chore of 
preparing their actuarial calculations would be highly burdensome 
and expensive, as well as risky; if the welfare fund 
misinterpreted the actual underlying intention of the parties and 
relied upon that misinterpretation in arriving at their actuarial 
calculation, all of the members of the multiemployer fund would 
suffer ultimately through the lower benefits and higher 
contributions which would result from trying to correct these 
errors.  By enacting section 515, Congress sought to eliminate 
such problems, leaving to employers and unions the simpler task 
of ensuring that the plain language of their collective 
bargaining agreements represents their intentions. 
     The courts of appeals which have had the opportunity to 
review section 515, including this court, have all regarded it as 
a limitation on the defenses available to an employer when sued 
by a welfare fund.  See, e.g., Agathos, 977 F.2d at 1505 
(employer may not assert fraud in the inducement as a defense); 
Trustees of Laborers Local Union # 800 Health and Welfare Trust 
Fund v. Pump House, Inc., 821 F.2d 566, 568 (11th Cir. 1987) (per 
curiam) (same); Southwest Administrators, Inc. v. Rozay's 
Transfer, 791 F.2d 769, 775 (9th Cir. 1986) (same), cert. denied, 
479 U.S. 1065 (1987); Gerber Truck, 870 F.2d at 1154 (employer 
may not assert oral agreement with union not to enforce terms of 
collective bargaining agreement as a defense);  Bituminous Coal 
Operators' Association, Inc. v. Connors, 867 F.2d 625, 632-36 
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (employer may not assert mutual mistake of fact 
in entering the collective bargaining agreement as a defense).   
     The Welfare Fund in the instant matter relies upon these 
cases to support its argument that McCormick cannot avoid paying  
its delinquent payments by arguing "mutual mistake" or 
"scrivener's error."  In particular, the Welfare Fund relies upon 
Bituminous Coal.  There, a multiemployer pension plan sued a 
delinquent coal operator for contributions.  Bituminous Coal, 867 
F.2d at 627-28.   The coal operator defended against the suit on 
the ground that both parties to the collective bargaining 
agreement had intended that the employer's contributions to the 
fund would stop once the plan became so over-funded that its 
contributions could no longer be deducted under federal income 
tax laws.  Thus, the operator presented the defense of 
"unilateral" and "mutual mistake."  Id. at 628.  The D.C. Circuit 
ruled that, under section 515, such a defense is not allowed:  
"If it means nothing else, section 515 means that, at least when 
the Trustees [of the fund] are not implicated in the alleged 
misconduct, their suit cannot be thwarted by defenses not 
apparent from the face of the [Collective Bargaining] Agreement."  
Id. at 634.  The court found that the terms of the collective 
bargaining agreement at issue obligated the employer to make 
contributions to the fund beyond the point of full funding, and 
concluded that "[t]he requirement of section 515 that [the 
employer] make its contributions 'in accordance with the terms or 
conditions of such . . . agreement' thus precludes any defense 
that would avoid that obligation."  Id. at 636. 
                                A. 
     The district court considered the Welfare Fund's arguments 
and its reliance upon Bituminous Coal and the other cases 
interpreting section 515.  It concluded, however, that the facts 
of this case presented a "mutual mistake" that could be asserted 
as a defense.  Memorandum Opinion at 16. The court ultimately 
premised its conclusion that McCormick need not pay its 
delinquency on International Union v. Murata Erie North America, 
Inc., 980 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1992).  We will discuss this case in 
some detail.   
     The Murata case arose when a company terminated two company- 
run pension plans.  Because the pension plans were over-funded, 
nearly $7 million remained in the plans after annuities were 
purchased for all employees.  Id. at 897.  Both the company and 
the union representing the employees argued that they were 
entitled to recoup this excess, and the union ultimately sued the 
company to resolve this dispute.  This court was called upon to 
determine whether the company itself or the union representing 
the employees was entitled to the excess funds remaining in the 
pension plans following termination.  Id. at 893. 
     Under the laws in place at the time, the company could not 
recoup the excess unless the plan documents explicitly authorized 
it to do so.  Id. at 895.  The union argued that the plan 
documents did not contain any such provision; the company 
countered that the drafters had intended for the document to 
contain a provision allowing the company to recoup excess and 
that its absence was the result of a "scrivener's error," i.e. 
the mistake of a scrivener in drafting the document.   
     We initially noted that allowing for reformation of the 
document based on a scrivener's error is in some tension with the 
statutory purposes of ERISA: 
     [O]ne statutory goal of ERISA is to insure that "every 
     employee may, on examining the plan documents, 
     determine exactly what his rights and obligations are 
     under the plan."  See Frank v. Colt Indus., Inc., 910 
     F.2d 90, 97 (3d Cir. 1990).  Allowing the doctrine of 
     scrivener's error to apply in ERISA cases would seem at 
     odds with this statutory purpose.  A plan document 
     containing a scrivener's error might mislead an 
     employee into believing he had rights or obligations 
     that he did not, in fact, have. 
Id. at 907.   
     We concluded, however, that under the facts of "this 
particular case," application of the scrivener's error doctrine 
was appropriate.  Id.  Specifically, we noted that the alleged 
error related to what was "admittedly a 'windfall' for either 
Murata or the [employees]," and thus the employees' "reasonable 
reliance on the . . . Plan documents would probably not have led 
them to believe that there would be any excess funds remaining."  
Id.  "Nor is it likely," we continued, "that reading the plan 
documents would have led participants to believe that if any 
excess funds remained after termination, that excess would be 
distributed to them."  Id.  Thus, ERISA's statutory goal of 
insuring that employee's may rely upon the plan documents was not 
undermined by allowing reformation of the scrivener's error.  
Having determined that there was a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding whether or not there was such an error, we remanded the 
case for further proceedings. Id. at 907-08. 
     The district court in the instant matter relied upon our 
decision in Murata to conclude that reformation of the language 
in the Eligibility Clause of the 1988 Agreement to reflect the 
true agreement of the parties "would not frustrate the purpose of 
ERISA," noting that "[t]here is no evidence that any plan 
participant or beneficiary relied upon the Eligibility Clause in 
the 1988 Agreement to determine his or her benefits under the 
plan."  Memorandum Opinion at 17. 
     We find the district court's reliance upon Murata misplaced.  
Murata did not involve a suit by a multiemployer fund, nor did it 
involve a claim for delinquent contributions.  Rather, it 
concerned efforts by an employer to retain the excess funds 
remaining in the company's own terminated pension plan.  
Therefore, section 515 and the concern that led Congress to enact 
it -- namely that multiemployer plans must be able to rely on the 
plain language of collective bargaining agreements or plans in 
order to ensure that they have sufficient funds to pay out 
required benefits -- were not at issue.  Instead, we were 
concerned only with ensuring that employees could reasonably rely 
upon the language of the plan.  It was these employees with whom 
the agreement was made and who, through their union, presumably 
had some knowledge of the original intent of the parties.   
     In the instant case, however, it is not relevant to our 
inquiry whether the newly hired employees relied upon the 
Eligibility Clause.  Neither the union nor any individual workers 
are parties to this lawsuit.  Instead, the question is whether, 
under section 515, the multiemployer Welfare Fund, and in turn 
its members -- third-party beneficiaries who were not parties to 
the collective bargaining agreement -- should be able to 
reasonably rely upon the language in the collective bargaining 
agreement as written.  Murata provides us no guidance in this 
area.   
                                B. 
     Having concluded that Murata is inapposite to the question 
before us, we must assess whether under section 515 a mutual 
mistake made between the employer and the union in agreeing to 
collective bargaining agreement language can be a defense to a 
delinquency action by a multiemployer welfare fund.  While this 
court has never specifically endorsed the D.C. Circuit's decision 
in Bituminous Coal, which held that mutual mistake cannot be 
asserted as a defense, we have clearly endorsed the decisions of 
other courts of appeals in concluding that traditional contract 
defenses normally available against third party beneficiaries are 
not available against welfare funds.  See Agathos, 977 F.2d at 
1505-06 (citing with approval to Benson, 907 F.2d at 316; Rozay's 
Transfer, 791 F.2d at 775; Gerber Truck, 870 F.2d at 1154).  In 
fact, we have explicitly held that there are only three 
recognized defenses which may be asserted by an employer as a 
means of avoiding contributions to an employee benefit plan as 
required under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement:   
     (1)  the pension contributions themselves are illegal . 
     . . ;  (2) the collective bargaining agreement is void 
     ab initio, as where there is fraud in the execution, 
     and not merely voidable, as in the case of fraudulent 
     inducement . . . ; and (3) the employees have voted to 
     decertify the union as its [sic] bargaining 
     representative, thus prospectively voiding the union's 
     collective bargaining agreement.   
Agathos, 977 F.2d at 1505 (citations omitted); see also Connors 
v. Fawn Mining Corp., 30 F.3d 483, 490 (3d Cir. 1994).  A "mutual 
mistake" between the union and the employer in drafting their 
collective bargaining agreement is not one of those recognized 
defenses, and we do not recognize it as such today.  
     McCormick argues, however, that we should affirm the 
district court's decision that mutual mistake may be asserted as 
a defense because the actions of the Welfare Fund itself were 
implicated in the mistake.  In essence, McCormick urges that we 
carve out a fourth defense which may be asserted by employers 
seeking to defend against actions by welfare funds to collect 
delinquent payments, namely that the welfare fund itself was 
responsible for a mistake in the collective bargaining agreement. 
     It does appear that Bituminous Coal itself, the D.C. Circuit 
decision holding that mutual mistake may not be asserted as a 
defense, leaves room for the defense of mutual mistake in cases 
where the welfare fund has engaged in misconduct causing the 
mistake: 
     When the trustees of a pension plan created pursuant to 
     collective bargaining agreement sue an employer for 
     contributions required by the plan, the employer may 
     not defend on the ground of union misconduct in 
     negotiating the agreement.  If it means nothing else, 
     section 515 means that, at least when the Trustees [of 
     the fund] are not implicated in the alleged misconduct, 
     their suit cannot be thwarted by defenses not apparent 
     from the face of the Agreement.  
Bituminous Coal, 867 F.2d at 634 (emphasis added).   
      Such a defense also does not appear to be inconsistent with 
Congress's concern in passing ERISA section 515, namely that 
"trustees of plans [be permitted] to recover delinquent 
contributions efficaciously, and without regard to issues which 
might arise under labor-management relations laws," and that 
plans be able to meet funding obligations that are hindered by 
delinquent funds.  126 Cong. Rep. 23,039 (1980) (remarks of Rep. 
Thompson).  If the Welfare Fund itself engaged in fraud or 
misconduct causing incorrect language to be injected into a 
collective bargaining agreement, it might be subject to the 
defense because it would no longer be in the role of a holder in 
due course.  However, we make no such holding. 
     McCormick does not allege that the Welfare Fund committed 
fraud or engaged in misconduct.  It merely makes sweeping 
statements in its brief before this court that "it is not 
disputed that it was the Welfare Fund's conduct which caused the 
mysterious modification of the eligibility terms" and that "the 
present delinquency action could have been avoided if the Fund 
had acted in a forthright manner,"  Appellee's Brief at 18.  
McCormick appears to place blame upon the Welfare Fund for simply 
providing the suggested language to the union when this language 
was different from the language of the previous two collective 
bargaining agreements.  It suggests that if a Welfare Fund 
"contemplates changing established and previously negotiated 
terms in a collective bargaining agreement, the Welfare Fund has 
to notify the parties of the modification,"  Appellee's Brief at 
19, and that its failure to do so should be viewed as misconduct 
which it, as the employer, can point to in defense of the 
delinquency claim.    
      We decline to consider as misconduct the failure on the 
part of a multiemployer welfare fund to notify employers of 
changes in the language it suggests for inclusion in the health 
and welfare benefit clauses of their collective bargaining 
agreements.  First, the absence of any provision in ERISA 
mandating such notification suggests that Congress did not intend 
to require it.  ERISA includes many provisions which require 
benefit funds or their administrators to notify participants and 
beneficiaries of particular facts or events.  Given "ERISA's 
interlocking, interrelated, and interdependent remedial scheme, 
which is in turn part of a 'comprehensive and reticulated 
statute,'" "[t]he assumption of inadvertent omission is rendered 
especially suspect." Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 
473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985) (citing Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation, 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980)).  If Congress 
considered such notification necessary, we think it would have 
included a provision requiring it.    
     Second, such a notification requirement would impose an 
undue burden on multiemployer welfare funds, hindering their 
effective operation.  Multiemployer welfare funds would be 
required to review the collective bargaining agreements of each 
of their members individually prior to sending out new suggested 
language, as well as to keep up with all of their other 
notification requirements and administrative obligations.  This 
seems an unduly harsh burden when it is not mandated by the 
statute, and more importantly, when its purported aim -- ensuring 
that plan participants are aware of their rights and obligations 
under the terms of their collective bargaining agreements -- can 
be more easily and efficiently met if the employer simply reads 
the language of the collective bargaining agreement prior to 
signing it.   
     We thus conclude that a multiemployer welfare fund has not 
engaged in any misconduct in failing to notify employers when 
language it suggests for inclusion in new collective bargaining 
agreements differs from language used in the employers' past 
collective bargaining agreements.  Indeed, there is no evidence 
and there is no allegation that the Welfare Fund in the instant 
matter surreptitiously included its suggested language in the 
collective bargaining agreement unbeknownst to either party.  
Rather, it submitted its suggested language to the union, and 
when the language appeared unchanged in the collective bargaining 
agreement that was ultimately signed -- and presumably read and 
approved -- by both the employer and the union, the Fund relied 
upon it, as it was entitled to do under section 515.    
 
                               IV. 
     McCormick urges this court to affirm the district court's 
opinion on various other grounds as well.  Although we may affirm 
a correct decision of the district court on grounds other than 
those relied upon by the district court,  see University of 
Maryland v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 923 F.2d 265, 275 (3d Cir. 
1991) (citing PAAC v. Rizzo, 502 F.2d 306, 308 n.1 (3d Cir. 
1974)), we decline to do so here for the reasons that follow.  
                                A. 
     McCormick first urges this court to affirm the district 
court on the theory that the 1988 Agreement was the result of 
fraud in the execution and is thus void.  As noted above, this 
court has recognized that fraud in the execution of a collective 
bargaining agreement may serve as one of the three possible 
defenses against a delinquency action by a welfare fund.  SeeFawn Mining, 
30 F.3d at 490; Agathos, 977 F.2d at 1505.  
"'[F]raud in the execution' arises when a party executes an 
agreement 'with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to 
obtain knowledge of its character or its essential terms.'"  Fawn 
Mining, 30 F.3d at 490 (quoting Rozay's Transfer, 791 F.2d at 774 
(other citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
     In our recent decision in Fawn Mining we found that fraud in 
the execution was available as a defense because the union 
affirmatively led Fawn Mining to believe that the collective 
bargaining agreement it was signing would not require it to 
contribute to a pension fund and Fawn Mining had no opportunity 
to determine otherwise: 
     Fawn Mining's defense is equivalent to a claim of 
     "excusable ignorance of the contents of the writing 
     signed."   
                           *    *    * 
 
     If an employer reviews a document reflecting the 
     agreements reached in collective bargaining and the 
     union surreptitiously substitutes a materially 
     different contract document before both sides execute 
     it, we think it clear that there has been a fraud in 
     the execution of the contract and that the agreement 
     reflected in the executed document is void ab initio  
     and unenforceable by the union.  The employer has never 
     manifested an assent to the terms of the alleged 
     contract, and the written document purporting to 
     evidence the agreement has been obtained by fraud. 
Fawn Mining, 30 F.3d at 492-93 (emphasis added).             
     Fawn Mining makes clear that McCormick cannot assert fraud 
in the execution as a defense here because the undisputed facts 
indicate that Webb had several opportunities to review the 
language of the agreement prior to its execution.  Specifically, 
the record reflects that Webb had the opportunity to review the 
language in the Eligibility Clause twice.  First, Greenawalt 
provided him with the suggested language during the negotiations.  
Then, following the negotiations but before the formal execution 
of the agreement, Greenawalt supplied Webb with a complete draft 
of the 1988 Agreement instructing Webb to "review it and get back 
to [him] with any additions or corrections."  Had Webb reviewed 
the agreement, he would have found the alleged error in the 
document and this entire dispute could have been averted.  There 
is thus no evidence of any fraud or indication that Webb executed 
the Agreement "'"with neither knowledge nor reasonable 
opportunity to obtain knowledge of its character or its essential 
terms."'" Fawn Mining, 30 F.3d at 490 (quoting Rozay's Transfer, 
791 F.2d at 774 (quoting U.C.C.  3-305(2)(c))) (other citations 
omitted).  Accordingly, McCormick may not assert fraud in the 
execution as a defense. 
                                B. 
     McCormick further argues on appeal that the Welfare Fund 
inexcusably delayed in bringing the instant action until 1993 
because it knew in August 1989 that McCormick was making 
contributions to the fund in accordance with the eligibility 
clause language from the 1983 and 1985 Agreements, and that 
accordingly, the Welfare Fund is precluded from recovering the 
delinquent funds under the doctrines of laches and waiver.  We 
reject both contentions. 
                                1. 
     The doctrine of laches consists of two essential elements: 
(1) inexcusable delay in instituting suit; and (2) prejudice 
resulting to the defendant from such delay.  See University of 
Pittsburgh v. Champion Products, Inc., 686 F.2d 1040, 1044 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1087 (1982).  We conclude that it 
does not apply here.  Within 19 months of its audit revealing the 
delinquency, the Fund formally began its efforts to collect the 
delinquency, and it filed suit in federal district court on April 
22, 1993, less than two years after the audit and well within the 
three year statute of limitations for bringing this type of 
action.  See Vernau v. Vic's Market, Inc., 896 F.2d 43, 45 (3d 
Cir. 1990).  There is no evidence that this delay was dilatory. 
     Furthermore, there is no evidence that McCormick was in any 
way prejudiced by this reasonable delay.  McCormick alleges it 
has been prejudiced because the amount it owes would have been 
smaller than that now claimed and that McCormick would not be 
facing liquidated damages, penalties and attorneys' fees.  In 
essence, McCormick asks this court to assume that it would have 
behaved differently and actually paid the delinquent amount if it 
had known that suit would be filed.  We have no basis for 
accepting this claim and we decline to do so.        
                                2.  
     McCormick further claims that the Welfare Fund has waived 
its opportunity to seek recovery of the delinquent funds because 
it failed to respond to McCormick's notification that it intended 
to follow the terms of the eligibility clause of the 1983 and 
1985 Agreements instead of the clause in the 1988 Agreement. 
     This court has explained that waiver is the "intentional 
relinquishment of a known right."  Paradise Hotel Corp. v. Bank 
of Nova Scotia, 842 F.2d 47, 51 (3d Cir. 1988).  The Supreme 
Court has held that in order to find waiver of a statutory right, 
"the waiver must be clear and unmistakable."  Metropolitan Edison 
Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983).  There is no evidence in 
the record of any waiver, let alone a "clear and unmistakable 
one," and accordingly the doctrine of waiver does not apply here. 
                                C. 
     McCormick further urges that we affirm the district court on 
the ground that the Welfare Fund would be unjustly enriched if it 
were to prevail on its claim.  In essence, McCormick claims that, 
because there is no evidence that the Fund provided coverage for 
any new employees for whom McCormick did not pay benefits until 
they met the 45-day eligibility language under the 1983/1985 
Agreements, the Fund should not receive the delinquent funds.  
However, a welfare fund is not unjustly enriched simply because 
it has received benefit payments on behalf of particular 
employees who have not made claims, because they presumably would 
have received coverage had they submitted claims.  A benefit 
payment is made for coverage in case a claim is submitted.  As 
such, a lack of actual claims is irrelevant.  Furthermore, the 
welfare fund expected to have those funds at hand for payout of 
benefits on behalf of other employees, including employees of 
other employers who are members of the multiemployer Welfare 
Fund. 
                                D. 
     Finally, McCormick urges that, should we decide, as we do, 
to reverse the order of the district court in favor of McCormick, 
we not reverse the judgment in favor of Webb.  We note that the 
district court did not specifically address this issue.    
     This court has held that there is no indication that 
Congress intended to hold corporate officers liable for a 
corporation's failure to contribute to benefit funds when there 
is no basis for piercing the corporate veil.  See Solomon v. 
Klein, 770 F.2d 351, 353 (3d Cir. 1985).  Appellants made no 
allegations in their complaint that the corporate veil should be 
pierced, but apparently sought judgment against Webb only on the 
basis of his position as a corporate officer.  Accordingly, we 
will dismiss the claim against Webb.  
 
                                V. 
     For the foregoing reasons we reverse the decision of the 
district court granting summary judgment in favor of defendants 
and denying plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment; issue 
summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs; and dismiss the claim 
against James Webb. 
 
                  CENTRAL PENNSYLVANIA TEAMSTERS 
                               v. 
                   McCORMICK DRAY LINE, INC. 
                           No. 95-1740 
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge, Dissenting 
     Until this case came along, I thought that this court was 
bound by our careful and important opinion holding that the 
equitable doctrine of contract reformation due to a scrivener's 
error is consistent with the purposes of ERISA.  See 
International Union v. Murata Erie North America, 980 F.2d 889, 
907 (3d Cir. 1992).  Four years later, the majority gut that 
decision. 
     In so doing, the majority embrace arguments from the 
Pennsylvania Teamsters Health and Welfare Fund that torture the 
canons of good reason and assault the cardinal axiom of ERISA 
that the rights and obligations of health and welfare funds stand 
or fall on what parties agree to in a collective bargaining 
agreement.   
     Before us, the Fund argues form over substance and trumpets 
that it has been prejudiced, even though it has not paid out one 
penny in accordance with the erroneous written language.  Before 
us, the Fund asserts that theoretical concepts of reliance inhere 
in the language of the agreement, when in fact the collective 
bargaining history of the parties since 1983 unquestionably 
reveals that both the parties to the labor agreement and the Fund 
have operated on the basis of the intended formula, which the 
parties have since restored.  The Fund's claim of reliance 
therefore amounts to an argument aptly described, in the words of 
the Immortal Bard, as "full and sound and fury and signifying 
nothing." 
 
                                I. 
     The facts in this case are simple and undisputed.  McCormick 
Dray is a trucking company that employs union drivers represented 
by Teamsters Local 764.  McCormick Dray and the Local negotiated 
a series of collective bargaining agreements.  Each of these 
agreements included a provision that McCormick would pay premiums 
to the Appellant Fund for the purpose of providing medical 
benefits to the drivers and their families.  Pursuant to these 
agreements, the employees would become eligible for benefits 
after they worked a specified period of time at McCormick.  Prior 
to 1983, that specified period of time was 30 days. 
     In 1983, due to the spiraling cost of premiums and the fact 
that many McCormick employees left after 30 calendar days but 
before 60 calendar days, McCormick and the Local negotiated a 
change in the eligibility clause from 30 to 45 days.  The Health 
and Welfare Fund approved the new language.  Both McCormick Dray 
and the Local believed that this eligibility clause was 
controlling unless subject to further negotiations.  Indeed, the 
next agreement, in 1985, repeated the 45-day eligibility 
language, as did the 1991 agreement. 
     Several months before the expiration of the 1985 agreement, 
however, McCormick and the Local began to negotiate terms for the 
1988 agreement.  The eligibility clause was never discussed in 
these negotiations, nor was any change in the clause contemplated 
by the parties.  A contract offer was prepared by McCormick and 
submitted to the Local, which approved.  Thereafter, during the 
Local's preparation of the final agreement, the 45-day 
eligibility language was replaced with language providing for 
coverage "as of the first day of the month immediately following 
[an employee's] employment."  JA 202-03. 
     Notwithstanding this change in the eligibility period, both 
parties assumed that the eligibility clause had remained intact; 
McCormick continued to make contributions to the Fund on behalf 
of newly hired employees under the conventional 45-day 
eligibility requirement, and the Fund made no payments in 
accordance with the erroneous language. 
     In August of 1989, the company discovered the error and 
advised the Local and new employees hired thereafter.  Principals 
of the Local were as surprised as McCormick that the eligibility 
period in the agreement was not 45 days; indeed, in 1993, the 
Local and McCormick agreed in writing that the 1988 language did 
not reflect either parties' intent.  When the 1988 agreement came 
up for renewal in 1991, the 45-day eligibility requirement again 
was included, and without negotiation.  Thus, the clause under 
consideration was contained in the original labor agreements of 
1983, 1985 and 1991, and, according to a written agreement, was 
"inadvertently misstated" in the 1988 agreement.  These are more 
than historical facts; this sequence looms large in the 
subsequent discussion of reliance by the Fund. 
     The Fund conducted an audit in 1991 and did not attempt to 
recoup any alleged deficiency until 1993.  The filing of its 
complaint followed on the heels of two developments: McCormick 
withdrew from the Fund in 1992 when the premium jumped from $277 
a month to approximately $400; and the Local requested action by 
the Fund as a method of putting pressure on McCormick to resolve 
an unrelated labor dispute. 
 
                               II. 
     Under the doctrine of scrivener's error, a clerical mistake 
made in drafting a document may be reformed on the basis of parol 
evidence, provided that the evidence of the mistake is "clear, 
precise, convincing and of the most satisfactory character" and 
that the mistake does not reflect the intent of the parties.  SeeIn re 
Estate of Duncan, 426 Pa. 283 (1967); see also Easton v. 
Washington County Ins. Co., 391 Pa. 28 (1957).  Here, there is no 
dispute between the signatories that a mistake has occurred, and 
the collective bargaining agreement clearly does not reflect the 
parties' intent. 
     We must then inquire whether importing the equitable 
doctrine of reformation of contract due to a scrivener's error is 
available to McCormick here, in an action brought under ERISA by 
a third party beneficiary to a collective bargaining agreement.  
To be sure, Section 515 of ERISA requires an employer to 
contribute to a multiemployer benefit plan in accordance with the 
"terms and conditions" set forth in the collective bargaining 
agreement.  29 U.S.C.  1145.  And there is no dispute that, 
literally construed, the terms and conditions of the 1988 
agreement make eligible any employee "as of the first day of the 
month immediately following his employment."  JA 202-03.  Yet 
applying rules with unfailing technical accuracy is not the 
aggregate of our responsibility.  As Judge Cudahy eloquently 
stated in Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension 
Fund v. Gerber Truck Services, Inc., 870 F.2d 1148, 1158 (7th 
Cir. 1989) (Cudahy, J., dissenting), "all rules must admit of 
equitable exception and modification in appropriate cases lest 
the tyranny of theory over reality bring about obnoxious 
results."  And indeed, we have recognized several exceptions to 
ERISA's mandate that contract defenses traditionally available 
against third party beneficiaries are not available against 
welfare funds.  See Agathos v. Starlite Motel, 977 F.2d 1500, 
1505-06 (3d Cir. 1992) (recognizing three exceptions to this 
general rule). 
     This was the philosophy that undergirded our Muratadecision, in which 
Judge Becker, writing for the court, 
acknowledged that a scrivener's error exception "would seem at 
odds with [the statutory purpose of] insur[ing] that 'every 
employee may, on examining the plan documents, determine exactly 
what his rights and obligations are under the plan.'  Murata, 980 
F.2d at 907 (citing Frank v. Colt Indus., Inc., 910 F.2d 90, 97 
(3d Cir. 1990)).  Even so, we decided to cast our die on the side 
of an equitable exception.  Thus there is nothing in our 
jurisprudence governing labor relations or ERISA, as expressed by 
Agathos and Murata, that endorses the majority's "tyranny of 
theory over reality" in bringing about results that are obnoxious 
to parties of a labor agreement.  The precise inquiry that 
remains, then, is whether the facts in this case should persuade 
us to eviscerate the central teachings of Murata. 
 
                               III. 
     The majority dismiss the Murata holding because that case 
"did not involve a suit by a multiemployer fund, nor did it 
involve a claim for delinquent contributions."  Opinion at 16.  
Neither of these distinctions is tenable. 
     The reason for disallowing the scrivener's error exception 
in a multiemployer context, say the majority, is that 
"multiemployer plans must be able to rely on the plain language 
of collective bargaining agreements or plans in order to ensure 
that they have sufficient funds to pay out required benefits."  
Opinion at 16.  The majority's reluctance stems from a 
multiemployer plan's concept of multiple fiduciaries with control 
over a common fund:  to allow one employer to bind a fund to pay 
benefits outside the strict terms of a plan would force all the 
employers to pay for one employer's reformation, and insofar as 
such payments damage the actuarial soundness of the plan, they 
burden the employees of many other corporations as well. 
     Whatever may be the legitimacy of this reasoning in the 
abstract, it is not relevant to the undisputed facts here.  
Neither other companies in the multiemployer consortium nor the 
Fund itself were forced to expend one cent, directly or 
indirectly, on the basis of the 1988 contract reformation.  Thus, 
the basis of the concept in theory had no adverse effect in 
reality.  The reason asserted for artificially engrafting an 
multiemployer exception to the teachings of Murata is simply not 
warranted here.  The double maxim says it all: cessante ratione, 
cessat ipsa lex, the rule follows where its reason leads; where 
the reason stops, there stops the rule. 
     The Fund neither collected premiums from McCormick nor 
provided compensation to employees based on a scrivener's error 
now subject to equitable reformation.  Indeed, McCormick 
contributed to the Fund consistent with the conventional 45-day 
eligibility, and the Fund made only corresponding outlays to 
employees.  Thus the Fund here could not possibly demonstrate 
reliance -- whether a kind of de jure actuarial reliance, or a de 
facto we-paid-out-benefits-in-reliance-on-the-error.  Logicians 
refer to such an argument as the fallacy of irrelevant 
conclusion, or ignoratio elenchi.    
 
 
                               IV. 
     The majority's additional reason for not following Murata is 
that we accepted the doctrine of scrivener's error in that case 
because what was at stake was a "windfall."  The majority argue 
that, because the Fund will entertain claims brought by any 
McCormick employee who was eligible for benefits under the 
erroneous eligibility clause, no "windfall" is at stake here.  
This argument flies in the face of basic economic reality.   
     I reiterate that the Fund has not made any payments in 
accordance with the erroneous language.  Surely, with the benefit 
of more than six years of hindsight, the Fund is now fully aware 
of any potential claims; it can thus calculate effortlessly 
whether the company's additional contributions would exceed the 
Fund's additional payouts to the employees.  Indeed, the filing 
of this action surely indicates that the simple math has been 
computed.  There have been no payouts whatsoever.  Therefore, 
when, without reliance on the error in the agreement, the Fund 
seeks to recover additional contributions from McCormick, that's 
a windfall.     
 
                                V. 
     The Fund never relied on the scrivener's error, nor does it 
deserve a windfall.  Moreover, in Murata we resolved the 
fundamental tension between recognizing an exception for 
scrivener's error and satisfying the purposes of ERISA.  The 
circumstances presented here provide no reason for decimating a 
well-reasoned decision of this court. 
     Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the district 
court.  I dissent. 
 
 
